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Radical Democratic Theatre 
 
The aim of this article is to interrogate the emergence of a form of 
participatory theatre that I shall call ‘radical democratic theatre’. The term 
‘radical democracy’ derives in the first instance from the political theory of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, but in terms of its application to theatre 
and performance practices, it might well be drawn in relation to Augusto 
Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed. Consequently, one useful starting point in 
grasping what is at stake when speaking of a radical democratic theatre is to 
trace the limits of Boalian thought by revisiting some of the theoretical 
assumptions upon which it stands. Two fundamental assumptions of 
specific concern have to do with (1) the nature of the theatre ‘subject’, as 
conceived by Boal, and (2) its relation to the political task of emancipation. 
Boal expresses this task in the following terms: ‘In order to understand the 
poetics of the oppressed one must keep in mind its main objective: to change 
the people – “spectators,” passive beings in the theatrical phenomenon – into 
subjects, into actors, transformers of the dramatic action’ (Boal, 2000: 122). 
To begin to approach the limits of this task, and probe what is implicated in 
its basic presuppositions, I want to focus on what will emerge as a 
significant theoretical difference over the way in which we might understand 
the nature and ambition of the strategy of ‘transformation’ – specifically, by 
drawing a distinction between the underlying aims of the Theatre of the 
Oppressed and the project of radical democratic theatre, as it might be 
conceived today. While Boal thinks the emancipatory potential of theatre 
predominantly in terms of freedom from oppression, by contrast, I will argue 
that the fundamental strategic aim of radical democratic theatre is not 
‘liberation’ per se, but the destabilisation of the relational space in which 
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political identities are first configured. Radical democratic theatre cannot 
‘liberate’ anyone but it can destabilise the matrices of a given political 
distribution and in particular release thereby what politics has suppressed – 
first, antagonism and dissent, and second, forms of reciprocal action and 
empathic identification on which new forms of sociality might be based. The 
shift in perspective marked here can be thought as a move away from the 
classical focus of the left on emancipation from oppression to the problem of 
what Iris Marion Young calls ‘domination’, which suppresses, not freedom, 
but rather equality at the level of political engagement. Domination, she tells 
us, ‘consists in institutional conditions which inhibit or prevent people from 
participating in determining their actions or the conditions of their actions’ 
(Young, 1990: 38).   
Placing the emphasis on equality, rather than freedom, by no means 
entails the denial of oppression. Rather, it signals the attempt to think 
emancipation beyond the classical rhetoric of revolutionary praxis. I will 
describe the possibility for this kind of strategic intervention, with reference 
to Michel Foucault, as necessitating, instead, the practice of the arraignment 
of power. It is this kind of idea that Randy Martin has in mind when, 
defending Boal’s legislative theatre from its critics, he describes how Boal 
was able to awaken a recalcitrant public to a consciousness of itself as the 
primal scene of the political, in which the ‘law can be interrupted, reversed, 
challenged’ (Martin 2006: 28). It is also, however, precisely here, where 
oppositional politics encounters the law, that the limits of this form of 
participatory theatre are disclosed. This is because it is precisely at the point 
where opposition moves from resistance to direct engagement with the 
structures and institutions of power that the democratic moment is most at 
risk of assimilation and co-option by the forces of the status quo. The 
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reasons for this are complex and unnerving – as Laclau and Mouffe have 
demonstrated through their astute critique of 20th century Marxism: ‘[there 
is] no subject’ they write, ‘which is absolutely radical and irrecuperable by 
the dominant order, and which constitutes an absolutely guaranteed point of 
departure for a total transformation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 169). I shall 
call this profound instability, which is constitutive of political identities, the 
‘democratic limitation’. The democratic limitation refers to both the inherent 
volatility of political identities and to the impossibility of reconciling those 
social antagonisms, constitutive of the political field, according to a universal 
political settlement. Through this concept we will be able to discern, not just 
what makes radical democratic theatre and performance possible; we will 
also be able to specify in what sense it can be called radical insofar as it 
reveals the precariousness of every essentialist political discourse. 
 
1. Radical Democracy 
To begin to understand what is so radical about democracy, I’d like to 
consider for a moment a controversial hypothesis. Radical democracy is a 
promissory note born with the democratic concept of politics but 
immediately suppressed in practice. This means, what passes for democratic 
politics today is simply the name designating a contemporary form of ‘anti-
politics’ insofar as the governmental operation of ‘participation-through-
representation’ consists in the organisation of the people around its 
fundamental exclusion from power. Democracy in representing the people 
represents the de facto suppression of the democratic impetus. This paradox 
of democratic politics is never far from view: politicians – the first to advocate 
the merits of democracy – as soon as they act, do so (to borrow a locution 
from Marx) as its undertakers.i Still, if democratic politics as a political 
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formation remains questionable today, this is not to say that the democratic 
impetus does not make its presence felt: here we are not speaking of the 
politics of political parties, but the politics of irruption – a politics of self-
determination wherein a ‘demos’ – a people – constitutes itself, however 
momentarily and partially.  
To grasp the significance of the concept of self-constitution it is 
important to distinguish between the articulation of the figure of the demos 
as the object of political discourse, and its ‘self-articulation’: between its 
nominalisation and its self-actualisation. What is at issue here is not simply 
the plural nature of democratic politics – participation in the contemporary 
res publica of various different constituencies, whose competing interests 
are regulated and administered via the electoral system – but rather what 
that participation implies when viewed outside of such a system: the militant 
emergence of ‘active citizenship’ as Étienne Balibar, usefully defines it – in 
which ‘citizenship is not primarily granted or conceded from above but [is] 
constructed from below’ (Balibar, 2004: 48). Consider a brief example, taken 
from Peru – a protest initiated by the activities in the year 2000 of a group of 
writers and artists called the Colectivo Sociedad Civil. Here we see radical 
democracy emerge in the form of an aesthetic practice which was able to 
stage the ‘de-structuring’ of the demos as articulated within the totalizing 
discourses of the political executive.   Emblematic of this de-structuring or 
‘dissent’ was Lava la bandera which began with the symbolic act of washing 
the Peruvian flag at the colonial fountain in the main square of Lima. 
[PHOTO INSERT]. Writing after the event, Gustavo Buntinx, one of its 
instigators, described the action as a ‘participatory ritual of national 
cleansing’ directed against the corrupt and increasingly despotic regime of 
Fujimori-Montesinos. Most instructive of all in this example is the way in 
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which the demos actualised itself through the spontaneous appropriation of 
the CSC initiative. Entirely independent of the original act, a series of copy-
cat actions quickly spread the protest from city to city, engulfing, eventually, 
the whole of Peru. Buntinx is quite right to speak here of ‘a system of 
collective identification’ through which emerged ‘a citizenry in the process of 
formation’ (Buntinx 2005: 46). However, a process of formation is more than 
an act of identification around the speculative positivity of a collective 
signifier; it is also an act of dis-articulation, whereby a discourse which 
constitutes the people as the passive object of political power suffers a 
radical loss of legitimacy. What Lava la bandera reveals is that it is not, and 
never has been, in the power of governments to decide on the proper 
meaning of the ‘name of the people’. On the contrary, the name of the people 
always bears within it an undisclosed remainder, irreducible to the 
discursive regime of the prevailing hegemonic order. This ‘democratic 
excess’, as Jacques Rancière calls it, is nothing less than ‘the impurity of 
politics, the challenging of governments’ claims to embody the sole principle 
of public life’ (Rancière 2006: 62). Lava la bandera attests to this sudden and 
unanticipated reversal of the people from the condition of passivity to 
activity; but more fundamentally, it reveals the democratic impetus, in its 
full radicality, as a power of dissent. In this sense the radicality of radical 
democracy derives not so much from the independence as from the 
constitutive exteriority of the demos with respect to the governmental 
exercise of power. The power of radical democracy lies in the exteriority of its 
forms. It is not then because the demos is excluded from political power – 
albeit that it often is – but because it can never be fully included that it 
retains within itself and reserves for itself the power of opposing a polity that 
claims to incarnate its ‘will’. 
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2. The Demos and Boal’s Concept of Theatre 
There is, for sure, a great deal of commonality between the Theatre of the 
Oppressed and radical democracy thus described. Boal himself tells us: ‘The 
Theatre of the Oppressed has as its first premise, the intention to 
democratise the stage space’ (Boal 1998: 67). In his book Legislative Theatre, 
Boal attempts to bind participatory politics and theatre to a common 
destiny. To do this Boal draws upon two founding parables – that of 
democratic politics and that of the birth of classical theatre – in order to 
elicit from them a proposition which will capture the very essence of a 
democratic theatre: the positing of the essential equality of actor and 
spectator within the theatrical event (Boal 1998: 61). According to the first 
narrative, we discover a fundamental contradiction at the origin of politics, 
constitutive of the very place of the people. It is politics that constitutes the 
demos as both the inert object of political power and as its legitimating 
source. On the one hand, the ‘polis comprised the entirety of people who had 
no power at their disposal’ (Boal 1998: 20) thus ‘[p]olis came to be the power 
of the powerless’ (Boal 1998: 21). On the other hand, the polis gives rise to 
the problem of citizenship, which requires the political organisation of a 
people under the sign of equality. The Greek solution to this dilemma is well-
known: they restricted the entitlement of citizenship to the few – the ‘fasces, 
the small bundle of sticks’ (Boal 1998: 21). It is consequently in the figure of 
the demos that, for Boal, we find the very image of the oppressed as well as 
the dissipated image of democratic politics. The second story by contrast 
serves to connect theatre to politics through the power of theatre to give 
voice to the act of dissent. This is captured in the tale of Thespis who, 
breaking ranks with the chorus, enraged the magistrate Solon by speaking 
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his mind on issues of political and civic life. When Solon, after the play had 
ended, accused Thespis of subversion, the wily trickster cunningly replied 
that it was not he who spoke but his character (Boal 2006: 65). In that 
moment, theatre as we know it, at least in Boal’s relating of the tale, was 
born with an act of sedition. 
Nevertheless, a problem emerges when we try to align the aims of a 
theatre of the oppressed with those of radical democracy. To begin to 
understand the nature of this difficulty we need to return to the canonical 
form in which this theatre of liberation first comes to expression. Boal’s 
position, although it most certainly changed over the years, might 
nevertheless be summarised according to two founding moments. The 
situation of the demos is defined by a specific kind of oppressive reality – a 
reality established on the basis of a relation of oppressors and oppressed. 
Typically, reality refers to a structure where, on the one hand, we can 
identify the dominant, exploitative and, in short, ‘ruling class’, and on the 
other hand, the people who suffer the expropriation of their labour, the 
exploited. Let me call this relation the ‘oppressive relation’ which can be 
approximated to the following interpretation of reality: wherever oppression 
and its immiserating effects can be found we also see a strict univocal 
relation in operation, establishing and fixing the identity of oppressor and 
oppressed. The ‘oppressive relation’ is thus the first moment in the Boalian 
schema. In order to divulge the second moment, however, we need to remind 
ourselves that for Boal the theatre, in the hands of the ruling class, is a ‘tool 
of domination’.   
In fact the problem is not that theatre exhibits the oppressive relation 
so much as it constitutes, as Boal says, a ‘powerful system of intimidation’ 
(Boal 2000: 46) whose main objective is ‘to bridle the individual, to adjust 
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him to what pre-exists’ (Boal 2000: 47).  It is not only ideological 
manipulation that Boal has in his sights here. More profound than this is 
Boal’s insight that theatre designates a specific structure of domination in 
which the audience is rendered inert insofar as it is the addressee of the 
theatre spectacle. This is the second moment in the schema of the Theatre of 
the Oppressed. It can be defined as follows: a structure of domination is a 
structure that produces passivity. It is a structure that suppresses the 
desire of the spectator to transgress the boundary which separates the world 
of the play from the world to which they have been condemned as if by fate. 
It corresponds to two distinct and incommensurable realities, dividing those 
who are entitled to act and make decisions, from those designated the 
recipients of those actions. In this way, what theatre does is infinitise the 
distance between the audience and the actor. What the structure of 
domination denies to us, thereby, is the ability to take possession of that 
which the actor embodies: what Boal calls the ‘protagonic function’ (Boal, 
2000: 180). Transformed into a mere object, the spectator is deterred from 
accessing the very language of reality. Hence Boal manages to connect the 
situation of the theatre (the machine which manufactures passivity) to that 
of the ‘oppressive relation’. In other words, he is able to extend the structure 
of domination through the metaphor of theatre to all social agents deprived 
of the protagonic possibility of acting: of participating in the affairs of public 
life, and thus of changing their world. 
It is also due to their close proximity that the structure of domination 
and the ‘oppressive relation’ can be correlated in a practical critique of the 
conditions of spectatorship. If the structural passivity of the audience is to 
be overcome it is precisely because the audience represent nothing less than 
the oppressed themselves, the people, the dispossessed demos. And that 
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means: in order to break the barrier that separates the audience from the 
actors – in order for theatre to become a ‘weapon for liberation’ (Boal 2000: 
ix) – a ‘theatre of the oppressed’ must of necessity invert the structure of 
domination which is the condition of theatre itself. The propaedeutic 
purpose to which Boal assigns his theatre could not be clearer: if theatre 
speaks the language of reality then a theatre of the oppressed must train the 
audience in that ‘protagonistic’ language. Thus, when Boal speaks of 
‘rehearsing the revolution’, the word rehearsal does not signify an operation 
that would entail the constant deferral of real efficacy: on the contrary. This 
is precisely what is at stake with the hypothesis of metaxis – the 
simultaneous occupation by the spect-actor of ‘two worlds, that of reality 
and that of the representation of this reality which is [his]’ (Boal 2006: 74). 
For Boal, the verb to rehearse, grasped in terms of the metaxis, becomes 
synonymous with the verbs to do and to be: ‘The rehearsal of an action is 
itself an action, the practice of an action then to be practiced in real life’ 
(Boal 2004: 72). To enter ‘metaxic space’ is not principally, as it is for 
Warren Linds, to enter a liminal and ungrounded space of play; nor is it 
simply a means of ‘developing an awareness of the space in which we work 
and interact’ (Linds 2006: 117). For Boal, it is to engage in an act of radical 
regrounding. Boalian rehearsal signifies a practice whose aim is the 
revolutionary transformation of the very condition of the theatre, which 
‘democratises’ it by overturning its structure of domination. Overturning the 
structure of domination opens the way for a ‘pedagogy of the act’, and 
already, in effect, provides a means of transforming reality itself and thus 
the ‘oppressive relation’ into a ‘non-oppressive relation’. Boal expresses the 
idea, at one point, in an extraordinarily arresting pronouncement: ‘All 
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spectators [are] equally free to experience the liberating seizure of speech’ 
(Boal 2006: 74). 
However, before we get carried away by the idea of the ‘liberating 
seizure of speech’, I would like to raise several objections over Boal’s 
accounting of reality. We are obliged to ask, at the very least, whether or not 
there is a danger here, that in the transitive passage described by the 
metaxis we have only moved from the action of fiction to the fiction of action. 
Why should we assume that an oppression rehearsed and reversed (on 
stage) would lead to an actual transformation of the oppressed at the level of 
reality? One way to answer this affirmatively would be to embrace a literalist 
concept of representation according to which one could then posit a 
transparent relation between a representation and its signified. Thus a 
passage could be established verbatim between two orders of reality: the 
order of the stage and the image, and the order of the world and the real. 
And indeed that is what Boal’s notion of ‘transubstantiation’ through 
metaxis assumes. But this provokes two worries, in my view. First, the 
assertion of the straightforward correlation of the ‘real of the image’ and the 
‘image of the real’ overlooks a high degree of opaqueness in the structure of 
representation. It is not enough, in other words, to suggest reality answers 
to its image, as though one could peer through the latter in order to disclose 
the laws of the former. It is well known that representation is not a 
‘transparent medium’ through which meanings are effortlessly transmitted 
literartim, and if it were, it could not be a representation (see Laclau 2007: 
98). The medium of representation is not the real but the symbolic. A further 
substantive question arises on the back of this concern and has to do with 
Boal’s juxtaposition of the structure of domination, the structure which 
produces passivity and inequality, and the oppressive relation, in which free 
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subjectivity is curtailed. It is by overturning the structure of domination that 
the Theatre of the Oppressed provides the subject with a means to liberate 
themselves from the oppressive relation by engaging in a critical 
appropriation of that image of reality. But in order to understand what 
limits, if any, we should set on this act of emancipation we need to examine 
whether oppression, thus described, that is, as an oppressive relation, is 
really adequate to the reality it is meant to structure; or whether, instead, 
the kind of relation identified here is itself founded on a more complex set of 
operations, which are not only more difficult to discern, but infinitely more 
difficult to transform.   
 
3. Theatre of the Oppressed at the Limits of Political Subjectivity 
The first assumption to be challenged is that of the oppressive relation itself. 
Rather than conceiving oppression as presenting itself in the register of a 
‘literalist’ logic, the task here is to see the ‘oppressive relation’ as already 
shot through with an opacity that undercuts the form of rationality 
demanded by the discourse of classical emancipation, upon which the 
rhetoric of transformation relies. Laclau explains the opacity usefully in 
terms of Derrida’s concept of undecidability: ‘the identity of the oppressive 
forces,’ he writes, ‘has to be in some way inscribed in the identity searching 
for emancipation. This contradictory situation is expressed in the 
undecidability between internality and externality of the oppressor in 
relation to the oppressed’ (Laclau 2007: 17). Here we confront a choice: 
either, we see the dichotomy separating the oppressed from the oppressor as 
hypostatizing the oppressive relation, resulting in the fixation of social 
agents in an intransigent struggle. This would see a pathological closure of 
the identity of each agential term around its fundamental impossibility, 
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encapsulated by the inassimilable presence of the other, since all acts of 
self-identification are constructed through an inverse reciprocity in which 
self-identification requires its excluded term. Or, we can conceive an 
alternative way of thinking the oppressive relation which takes account of 
the ambiguity constitutive of social antagonisms. What results in this case is 
a rejection of any talk of the radical overcoming of antagonism, i.e., the 
elimination of alterity from the social field, since antagonism on this view is 
accepted as constitutive of every identity. Accordingly, the struggle shifts 
elsewhere, as Laclau puts it, to ‘the constant renegotiation of the forms of 
[the other’s] presence’ (Laclau 2007: 30).   
No doubt it could be objected that Boal conceives the ‘oppressive 
relation’ in rather more complex terms than those that I have ascribed to 
him. One might point to Boal’s later therapeutic techniques, as Mady 
Shutzman has done, which ‘address themselves to the internalized struggle 
between the interdependent oppressed and oppressor within each individual’ 
(Shutzman 2004: 141). Hence it could be argued that Boal acknowledges the 
process whereby we assimilate the identity of the oppressor to ourselves. 
Boal’s notion of ‘cop in the head’ would seem, at least, to recognize a certain 
complexity in the dimension of the subjectivity of the oppressed. Otherwise 
stated, for Boal, situations of oppression are also situations of repression – 
not in the sense of physical force, but in the psychoanalytic sense of an 
unconscious operation, a psychic repression. With this, the oppressive 
relation is not obviated, but internalised by the everyday evasions we 
ourselves practice. This brings us, however, to assumption number two: 
namely, to the idea that practices of everyday repression not only institute 
but serve to conceal oppression at the level of a suppressed reality, namely, 
through the perpetration of some kind of ideological deception which can be 
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psychoanalysed as misrecognition. When Boal says, for instance: ‘if an 
internal oppression exists, it is because it comes from some barracks or 
other, exterior to the subjectivity of the subject’ (Boal 2006: 6), he is also 
implicitly endorsing a concept of identity that is ultimately recuperable, as 
though subjectivity in the final instance existed prior to the processes of 
domination through which it is formed. Against this idea, which conflates 
the theory of ideology with that of the unconscious, we need to challenge the 
proposition that it is merely a matter of exposing oppression by breaking 
through the tactics (psychic or otherwise) of repressive agents (ourselves 
included), whose function is precisely to repress knowledge of this reality so 
as to stupefy us into tolerating oppression. As Slavoj Žižek has shown, 
ideology is misconstrued when considered a falsification of a ‘real’ reality 
which gets suppressed (Žižek 2008: 45); on the contrary, reality, as Freud 
himself asserted through the ‘reality principle’, is precisely a positivity that I 
embrace in the forms of self-identification through which my social being 
becomes a positivity for me.  Psychoanalytically grasped, reality does not 
correspond to something unconscious, something suppressed, but to a state 
of wakefulness.   
Consequently, overcoming ideological misrecognition cannot simply be 
a matter of modifying the behaviour of domesticated subjects. Indeed, such 
an analysis of the oppressions that we identify demonstrate that it is not a 
question of transforming subjects and their reality, but rather of confronting 
the symbolic network constitutive of social reality and its processes. It is 
through these structures that political identities and subjectivities are 
constructed. This means, we would have to confront not simply the 
oppressive relation and its ideological repression, but the rather more 
complex processes of subjectification and ideological inscription through 
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which the ‘oppressive relation’ produces subjects. The shift in perspective 
which this requires, as we shall now see, corresponds to what I earlier 
described as a shift from the problem of emancipation – the classical 
problem of freedom – to that of domination – the contemporary problem of 
inequality. Here, the structure of domination is not, as it was for Boal, a 
means of ‘adjusting’ the subject to the condition of his or her oppression. 
Nor is it about a lack of individual freedom. Rather, it specifies that the very 
condition of the subject is domination itself.  
To say that the structure of domination produces subjective passivity 
is to say that it prohibits and deters the democratic impetus from coming to 
expression; it suppresses the desire for any active participation in 
determining the collective conditions of one’s social existence. One could 
press this idea further and go so far as to say in a modern disciplinary 
society such as ours, the structure of domination disposes of any need for 
an oppressive relation. This leads to Foucault’s famous remark in Discipline 
and Punish, the ‘perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise 
unnecessary’ (Foucault 1991: 201). In other words: if as we have said the 
condition of the subject is domination itself, then that is because domination 
produces its effects through complex processes of subjectification. On the 
other hand, here we also reach a conceptual limit, which forces us to 
reconsider the totalising effects of the structure of domination construed as 
a process of subjectification via Foucault. If domination really is all pervasive 
– if the subject is merely an effect of social relations, which ‘predetermine’ 
the perceptible forms through which it is manifested, then there can be no 
non-mediated perspective available to the subject whereby the social 
relations in which they feature could be rendered visible as a whole in their 
immediacy, since that would mean the subject could break free of the very 
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constraints that make social existence intelligible. But it then becomes 
almost inconceivable how one would be able to break out of the ‘circle of 
oppression’, which operates on subjects. Correlatively, it becomes almost 
impossible to see how, pursuing this logic, Foucault could avoid totalising 
the apparatus of inegalitarian power. So how does this way of 
reconceptualising the structure of domination help us understand the 
strategic possibilities of radical democratic theatre and performance? In fact 
the resources for answering this question can already be found in Foucault: 
‘there are no relations of power without resistances; the latter are all the 
more real and effective because they are formed right at the point where 
relations of power are exercised’ (Foucault 1980: 142).   
In Foucault’s analysis of power, two principal operations are 
discernible: one represents the procedural application of power; the other 
endeavours to legitimate those practices. Power acquires its legitimacy by 
operating in the name of knowledge whose warrant is ‘truth’. Acquiescing to 
such truths, we acquiesce to the power of knowledge. In this way, we also 
inevitably consent, as Foucault reminds us, ‘to [those actual] effects of power 
which [truth] induces’ (Foucault 2000: 132) – that is, we acquiesce to 
procedures of normalisation productive of subjects. This is why, in order to 
break with, or at least slacken the grip of a specific structure of domination, 
one must be able to bring the framework of knowledge on which it rests into 
question: ‘It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power 
(which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the 
power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic, and cultural, 
within which it operates at the present time’ (Foucault 2000: 133). The 
question remains, however: how, given the ubiquity and pervasiveness of 
power, in Foucault’s account, can we speak intelligibly of reversing a 
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procedure of normalisation and thus envisage a process in which a 
delegitimation of a particular regime of truth would be possible? The answer 
can only be that the totalising effects of power are entirely contingent. In 
other words, while power is necessarily present in every social relation, it is 
never entirely reducible to those relations, i.e., its form of appearance is 
incapable of resolving itself into a fully constituted totality. Otherwise put, 
the processes of subjectification never result in the full determination of the 
subject and the absolute fixation of the identity of social agents.   
The significance of this point can be clarified more precisely once we 
align it with a second move, using Laclau and Mouffe’s appropriation of 
Althusser’s notion of overdetermination – the claim, in their words, that: 
‘Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely 
consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the 
establishment of a certain order’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 98). The 
overdetermination of the subject means that the ‘category of subject is 
penetrated by the same ambiguous, incomplete and polysemical character 
which overdetermination assigns to every discursive identity’ (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2001: 121). It is because of this constitutive openness of identity – 
what I earlier called the ‘democratic limitation’ – that a structure of 
domination is always in principle reversible. Just as, correspondingly, it is 
due to the irreducibility of power to the facticity of its forms that we can 
speak of the possibility of its redistribution and thus of the possibility of 
detaching it from a given discursive regime of truth. Taken together, what 
this amounts to is nothing less than the practice of which we spoke earlier, 
through which the democratic impetus is revealed as the power of the demos 
to de-structure its formal nominalisation, thus enabling it to break with a 
given political conjuncture. 
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4. The Strategic Aims of Radical Democratic Theatre 
Let us see, now, how we can apply this analysis in order to better articulate 
the strategic aims of radical democratic theatre and performance. To begin 
with it should be said that there is nothing essentially democratic about the 
theatre. Given this, it would be absurd to suppose that the strategic aim of 
radical democratic theatre is the redemption of the Theatre – its re-
enchantment, so to speak, brought about by the retrieval of what would in 
effect be its suppressed ‘truth’: that the theatre constitutes the proper site of 
(as Nancy has called it) the ‘inoperative assembly’. The argument for a 
radical democratic theatre does not pose as an essentialist discourse on the 
nature of theatre: it does not say that theatre is political, and it claims no 
special privilege for theatre as the ‘medium of the people’. Radical democratic 
theatre is perfectly consistent with Rancière’s refusal of the ‘presupposition 
that the theatre is communitarian in and of itself’ or that its aim should be 
the emancipation of the spectator (Rancière, 2009: 16). What is at stake here 
is by no means the political status of theatre or its audience, but rather the 
political status – or lack thereof – of those who participate in radical 
democratic theatre and performance projects – a mode of political 
intervention which proceeds by means of theatre- and performance-making 
practices and through which a certain kind of political activity becomes 
enabled, namely, democratic participation. The strategic aim of radical 
democratic theatre, wherever one finds it, is the promotion and activation of 
democratic politics. Its task – to borrow from Chantal Mouffe – is to ‘[deepen 
and extend] the range of democratic practices through the creation of new 
subject positions within a democratic matrix’ (Mouffe 1993: 57).   
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On the other hand, by asserting that there can be no political essence 
associated with the theatre, either democratic or otherwise, one should 
perhaps also point out that according to the principle of the democratic 
limitation, there is equally no essence underpinning communitarian politics. 
If the thesis of the democratic limitation holds, community – the 
presupposition of a basic but suppressed commonality constitutive of the 
demos – cannot mean that the hidden truth of democratic action and the 
ultimate goal of participation is the achievement of the state wherein a 
community becomes wholly ‘what it is’. Democratic action – if it aims at the 
formation of a collectivist subject – is always tentative, provisional, and 
contingent. Insofar as the democratic community is radical, it names a 
problem and not a solution. This is why democratic action, in its radical 
sense at least, rests on two essentially negative procedures: the de-
legitimation of the process of subjectification (i.e., the declassification of 
subjects) – in fact, their uncoupling from the discursive regime of truth 
according to which they are ‘interpellated’. And the re-articulation of those 
subjects through a counter-hegemonic process in which political power is 
challenged and redistributed, according to multiple sites of localisation and 
resistance, and in view of which new subject positions and identities are 
opened up on the ground. The first destabilises the structures of 
domination; the second provides the opportunity for new possibilities of 
political engagement and struggle. It is precisely this dual process that 
radical democratic theatre and performance projects engage in and why, as I 
suggested earlier, they should be thought of in terms of the ‘practice of the 
arraignment of power’. Arraignment of power is in fact fundamental to the 
strategic possibility of radical democratic theatre because it is fundamental 
to radical democratic action.   
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Singaporean artist Jay Koh’s photographs ‘Signals from Burma’ 
(2007-8), taken in and around Rangoon, provide an interesting case in point. 
At first glance we are confronted with a collection of rather obtuse images 
featuring apparently random individuals. These anonymous, silhouetted 
figures are, in fact, united by nothing other than what they are doing: 
performing a hand signal. Some pose in front of well-known attractions, 
gesturing as a tourist might. Others gesture more furtively – as in the 
photograph of the man whose hand, casually resting on the back of his head 
as he walks down a street, enacts the same peculiar hermetically-sealed 
gesture of signalling. [INSERT IMAGES] The power and significance of these 
apparently contingent, indecipherable, barely visible acts, photographed in a 
manner reminiscent of holiday snaps, is only revealed once one recalls that 
in a militarised state such as Burma it is the police order that determines 
and permits the production and dissemination of meaning. In a system 
where the enunciative function of speech is strictly monitored – restricted to 
pre-assigned significations – and where no-one has power over their own 
gestures, these anonymous, silent, barely noticeable performances translate, 
suddenly, into a forceful poetics of clandestine political engagement and 
resistance. In this way, through the seemingly inscrutable gestures of 
ordinary Burmese people, Koh demonstrates that individual expression is 
always a possibility, no matter how repressive the situation.   
If the word ‘arraignment’, in its most general sense, means ‘to call into 
question’, its more familiar and specific juridical usage is equally relevant. 
When we think of an arraignment in legal terms, we do so in reference to the 
charge or indictment brought on behalf of a litigant against the defendant in 
a court of law. Both meanings – to accuse or indict and to call into question 
– are pertinent to this notion of the practice of the arraignment of power. The 
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idea, then, is twofold. Firstly, arraignment involves calling into question the 
multiple operations of power that constitute the determinate situation of 
subjection through which subjects are interpellated. It does this by opening 
up a space in which the authority of a specific power of subjection is 
effectively suspended. In particular, it calls into question the dissociating 
strategies of power by opening up what we might call a space of speech. In 
fact it reopens precisely that interlocutory and participatory space which 
disciplinary power attempts to seal off, stifle, or even eliminate altogether. A 
theatre that practices the arraignment of power, then, is by definition a 
theatre that stages the encounter between subjects and the conditions of 
their subjection. Specifically, it brings the subject back to a suppressed 
power of dissent. The second aspect of arraignment, which is implied in the 
act of calling into question, is indictment: to arraign power is always to 
indict a determinate situation of subjection. On the one hand, therefore, to 
arraign is to begin to reconfigure social agency by withdrawing the subject 
from those techniques of supervision that aim to suppress dissidence, 
disobedience, and non-compliance; on the other hand, it is to expose the 
nexus of knowledge and truth – the framework of power itself – to the 
questionability of its legitimacy.  
Here a final example will help elucidate the point, as well as bring us 
back to the point at which we departed from Boal: the liberatory power of 
speech. ¡Por Nosostras Mismas! (‘By Ourselves’ 1998) was a collaborative 
project originated by Jesusa Rodriguez, which targeted the glaring 
inequality, caused by ill-health, illiteracy, gender discrimination and 
widespread domestic violence, inhibiting the personal, economic, cultural 
and political development of indigenous female agricultural workers in rural 
Mexico. What is interesting about ¡Por Nosostras Mismas!, however, and 
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what makes it a particularly fitting place to conclude, is precisely the 
emphasis it places on the suppressed power of speech. The primary goal of 
the project was, as Javier Cabral Soto explains in the introduction of the 
book which followed, ‘an education of equality in all aspects of life with the 
aim of reducing the difference between men and women’ (Soto 2004: 17). 
Using group exercises, structured around themes such as ‘woman and her 
social condition’ or ‘woman as creator’, the participants were able to gather 
together to share, reflect upon, and collectivise their experiences. 
Significantly, the project did not articulate itself around an explicitly 
ideological struggle; nor was it primarily about rehearsing possible solutions 
to the immense problems confronting these women. Rather, it was 
fundamentally an educative process, using participatory tactics such as 
storytelling, mask-making, and music-making in a creative endeavour that 
would enable the women to experience for themselves what had for so long 
been denied to them: the active self-assertion of equality and citizenship. 
The educative method here did not primarily refer to knowledge acquisition; 
it signified, rather, and more fundamentally, a process of re-subjectification. 
In ¡Por Nosostras Mismas!, in other words, what we find is a form of theatre 
that intervened in a situation of inequality with the strategic intention of 
transforming the conditions of subjectification. What it ‘transformed’ was not 
the oppressive relation per se, but the context according to which the women 
were denied the power of collective – that is to say, political – speech.  
What we can surmise, from this brief example, I think is the following 
concluding observation: if radical democratic theatre is able to produce 
political ‘effects’, it is because it is able to provide the means for the effective 
suspension of the conditions of operation through which a structure of 





Balibar, É. [2004) We, The People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational 
Citizenship, trans. James Swenson, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Boal, A. (2006) The Aesthetics of the Oppressed, trans. Adrian Jackson, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Boal, A. (2000) Theatre of the Oppressed, Pluto Press. 
 
Boal, A. (1998) Legislative Theatre, London: Routledge. 
 
Buntinx, G. (2005) “Where? When? ¿Dónde? ¿Cuándo?” in When Faith 
Moves Mountains,  Madrid: Turner. 
 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish, The Birth of Prison, trans. Alan 
Sheridan, London: Penguin. 
 
Foucault, M. (2000) Power, Essential works of Foucault 1954-1984, Vol.3, 
New York: New York Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1980) Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings 1972-1977, Harlow: Longman. 
 
Laclau, E. (2007) Emancipation(s), London: Verso. 
 
 23 
Laclau, E and Mouffe, C. (2001) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics, London: Verso. 
 
Linds, W. (2006) “Metaxis, Dancing (in) the in-between” in A Boal 
Companion, Dialogues on theatre and cultural poltics eds. Jan Cohen-Cruz 
and Mady Schutzman, New York: Routledge. 
  
Martin, R. (2006) “Staging the Political: Boal and the Horizons of Theatrical 
Commitment” in A Boal Companion, Dialogues on Theatre and Cultural 
Politics, New York: Routledge. 
 
Mouffe, C. (1993) The Return of the Political, London: Verso. 
 
Rancière, J. (2006) Hatred of Democracy, trans. Steve Corcoran, London: 
Verso. 
 
Rancière, J.  (2009) The Emancipated Spectator, trans. Gregory Elliott, 
London: Verso. 
 
Shutzman, M. (2004) “Brechtian Shamanism, the political therapy of 
Augusto Boal” in Playing Boal, Theatre, Therapy, Activism, New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Soto, J. (2003) ¡Por Nosostras Mismas! Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social. 
 
Young, M. (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
 24 
 




                                                 
i When Tony Blair was asked by the first Chilcott Inquiry to justify his 
expression of ‘no regrets’ over the decision to invade Iraq his post hoc appeal 
was to the legitimacy of a ‘just war’, self-evidently encapsulated by – or such 
was his assumption – the proper name ‘democracy’. According to Blair’s 
contention, in toppling Saddam, ‘the certainty of suppression’ had been 
supplanted by the ‘uncertainty of democratic politics’ (quoted in The 
Guardian 30.01.10). 
